Board leadership structure for Chinese public listed companies by Yu, Mei & Ashton, J.K.
Board leadership structure for Chinese 
public listed companies 
Yu, M. and Ashton, J.K.  
Author post-print (accepted) deposited in CURVE March 2015 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Yu, M. and Ashton, J.K. (2015) Board leadership structure for Chinese public listed 
companies. China Economic Review, volume (in 
press) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2015.01.010 
 
Additional note: Article in press, full citation details will be updated once available. 
 
Publisher statement: NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for 
publication in China Economic Review. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such 
as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control 
mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this 
work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published 
in China Economic Review [in press (2015)] DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2015.01.010. 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURVE is the Institutional Repository for Coventry University 
http://curve.coventry.ac.uk/open  
  
1 
 
Board leadership structure for Chinese public listed companies 
                                             
                                                 Mei Yu
a
 and John K Ashton
b
 
 
                                                    Abstract 
 
It is widely accepted that board leadership structure and whether the chairperson and CEO 
roles should be undertaken jointly or separately affects the performance of a firm. Despite 
this consensus, empirical evidence presents major uncertainties as to the direction and degree 
of this influence. This study contributes to this debate by examining the relationship between 
board leadership structure and firm performance and the expense ratio, using propensity-
score matching methods for Chinese PLCs from 2003–2010. It is reported that while CEO 
duality is not related to companies’ profitability ratios, it is linked to a higher expense ratio 
compared to matched companies with a separate board leadership structure. This indicates 
that a separate board leadership structure is an effective corporate governance arrangement to 
reduce agency costs for Chinese PLCs.  
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1.  Introduction  
Following its impressive economic transformation of the past 35 years there is an urgent need 
for a workable corporate governance model within China (Fan, 2004). This study contributes 
to this policy area by examining the veracity of one of the many corporate governance 
principles introduced into China in the last twenty years. Specifically we scrutinize whether 
the western prescription for dividing the role of chairperson and CEO is appropriate in the 
Chinese context. To achieve this goal the study addresses three questions:   
 
a) Which factors determine the board leadership structure for Chinese PLCs?  
b) Does the CEO duality have implications for the performance of Chinese PLCs?   
c) Does a separate board leadership structure reduce agency costs for Chinese PLCs 
compared to CEO duality?  
 
Separate board leadership structure and CEO duality encapsulates circumstances where the 
CEO and chairperson positions are separated and combined respectively. These questions are 
tested using logit regression analysis and propensity-score matching methods to examine the 
determinants and effects of board leadership structure for 9,371 firm-year observations of 
non-financial Chinese PLCs, between 2003 and 2010. Firm performance is examined using 
firms’ profitability ratios (return on assets and return on equity; hereafter ROA and ROE) and 
agency costs using the expense ratio. It is reported that a board leadership structure with 
separate CEO and chairperson positions is an effective corporate governance arrangement for 
Chinese PLCs. 
 
While it is widely acknowledged that the board of directors plays a vital role in a firms’ 
corporate governance, board organisation is important to examine in the Chinese context. Our 
current comprehension of board leadership structure was developed and refined in the UK 
and the USA which organise, own and run firms in very different ways from China. China 
differs from many western nations in terms of corporate governance, law, business culture 
and ownership. In contrast to US companies, Chinese companies normally have a relatively 
concentrated ownership structure with state ownership of many firms, limited information 
disclosure, poor investor protection and reliance on the banking system for finance. 
Subsequently, Chinese companies face conflicts beyond the traditional principal-agent 
problem observed in western nations, with the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
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controlling shareholders a growing concern (e.g. Zhu & Ma, 2009; Jian & Wong, 2010; 
Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012). Through this examination we determine whether board 
leadership structure, derived from experience in the USA and Europe and often assumed to 
be universal in application, has a similar influence on firm performance and agency costs in a 
distinct Chinese corporate environment.   
  
This study is timely as while the academic literature includes abundant studies examining the 
effect of board structure in respect of firm performance, only a handful of studies have 
examined the determinants of board structure. While these studies have focused on the 
determinants of board size and outside directors (e.g. Cierco, Wintoki & Yang, 2013; Guest, 
2008), relatively few studies have examined the determinants of board leadership structure 
(e.g. Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008; Pathan & Skully, 2010; Dey, Engel & Liu, 2011) and 
considered these concerns within Western nations. This assessment also builds on past 
studies  which have examined the determinants of board size and independence (see Chen & 
Al-Najjar, 2011; Su, Xu & Phan, 2008) and board leadership structure (e.g. Xie, 2012) for 
Chinese companies in earlier periods. This study differs from and extends these past 
contributions by examining the determinants of board leadership and the effects of board 
leadership structure on firm performance for Chinese PLCs between 2003 and 2010. Further 
we address long standing concerns that endogeneity which may influence key relationships in 
this debate by using propensity-score matching methods. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the relevant literature and empirical 
evidence. Section 3 describes the hypotheses, model design and variable definition. The 
results of the data analysis are presented in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are presented in 
Section 5.  
 
2.  Literature Review  
Explanations of how corporate governance arrangements operate in the USA and Europe 
have been shaped by a literature of a considerable lineage. Concerns as to the separation of 
ownership and control were raised by Berle and Means (1932) and agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) arose to examine whether managers of firms would follow the maximization 
of the owners’ wealth or pursue personal gains when facing a dispersed ownership structure. 
This literature assumed the agency relationship between the owners of the firm and managers 
gave rise to agency costs as managers may not act in the best interest of the owners (Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976). These agency costs arise when the interests of the firm’s managers are not 
aligned with those of the owners, take the form of perks, shirking, and making self-interested 
and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth (Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000). Building 
on a belief that boards of directors are one of the most efficient internal governance 
mechanisms to control and supervise top management (Jensen, 1993; Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella, 2003) many corporate governance arrangements have been developed in Western 
nations and introduced into China under the belief that they would enhance firm performance 
through alleviating these agency costs. As these corporate governance arrangements have 
been numerous this study focuses on the determinants and effects of board leadership 
structure due to both its widespread dissemination internationally and pertinence to the 
Chinese context.  
 
2.1   Chinese Experience of Corporate Governance Arrangements 
China is an informative case to examine the determinants and effects of board leadership 
structure due to the distinct ownership structure and external operating environment. Indeed 
many of these differences could have a significant influence on the relationship between 
board leadership structure and firm performance.  
 
A critical difference between China and many European and North American nations is that 
state ownership of firms is significant in China. During China’s economic reforms of the 
1980s, the Chinese government privatized small and medium sized state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and corporatized large SOEs. Though state ownership has been reduced over time, 
the state and other government institutions have retained a majority stake in privatized firms 
(Li, Moshirian, Nguyen & Tan, 2007). As property rights theory claims property rights in the 
private sector are more clearly defined and private ownership leads to more effective 
monitoring of management performance (Alchain, 1965; McCormick & Meiners, 1988), this 
situation could limit firm performance. Alternatively the Chinese state could play both a 
‘helping hand’ as well as a ‘grabbing hand’ in its role as shareholder. The state can provide 
support regarding finance and resources and a higher level of state shareholding may 
overcome ‘free rider’ problems (Tian & Estrin, 2008; Yu, 2013).  
 
Relative to many Western nations, investor protection is poor and law enforcement can be 
weak in China. While there is variation among European nations particularly in levels of 
investor protection, these concerns are amplified in China. Many Chinese PLCs have a large 
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controlling shareholder which enables wealth to the tunneled from smaller investors. 
Subsequently Chinese companies face conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders with the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders a growing concern (e.g. Zhu & Ma, 2009; Jian & Wong, 2010; Huyghebaert & 
Wang, 2012).  
 
To amend for these and other concerns arising from the process of economic reform, Chinese 
corporate governance rules have been revised to accentuate the role of directors, strengthen 
their control over managers and provide better protection for investors (Tenev & Zhang, 
2002). The Chinese Company Law was implemented in 1994, marks the starting point of 
these corporate governance reforms. The Company Law articulates the responsibilities, rights, 
and liabilities of shareholders, the board of directors, managers and the board of supervisors. 
This system involved listed companies employing two tier-boards: a main board of directors 
and a supervisory board. The function of the supervisory board is to implement financial 
supervision of the firm and protect the best interests of the firm and its shareholders. As the 
published statements of supervisory boards are rarely contested with decisions made by the 
board of directors and by executives (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Chen, Liu & Li, 2010)  
the supervisory board has been widely viewed to be more decorative than functional and 
corporate governance assessments have predominantly focused on the board of directors, 
rather than the board of supervisors.  
 
These Chinese corporate governance arrangements have been extended within subsequent 
reforms. The Basic Norms of State Owned Large and Medium Sized Enterprises in 
Establishing a Modern Enterprise System and Strengthening Management (hereafter referred 
to as The Basic Norms) were issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission in 
October 2000. This extension to corporate governance arrangements stipulated amongst other 
recommendations, in principle the chairperson of the board of directors and the general 
manager (CEO) could not be the same person. As China has a weak institutional environment 
and investor protection is poor, CEO duality could result in higher agency costs for Chinese 
PLCs. In separating the two positions, it was anticipated the board could execute its 
supervision and monitoring roles more effectively.  
 
Reflecting these high levels of state ownership and that the appointment of many CEOs is 
influenced by the government (Su, Xu & Phan, 2008) conforming with the Basic Norms 
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reforms provides political legitimacy for the firm. Despite these incentives the adoption of 
this corporate governance amendment has been torpid, reflecting the considerable autonomy 
of Chinese companies in determining an optimal board composition (Peng, Zhang & Li, 
2007). Separating CEO and chairperson positions has therefore varied across firms and over 
time (Dahya & Travlos, 2000); the percentage of Chinese PLCs practising CEO duality 
declined gradually from approximately 60 per cent in the early 1990s, to 30 per cent by the 
end of the 1990s (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song & Zhang, 2004) and to approximately 10 per cent in the 
early 2000s.  
 
The implementation of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China in 2002, 
serves as another milestone in the reform of Chinese corporate governance and executive 
incentives. These developments were largely based on the regulations and practices in 
Western economies.  This process was advanced with the Split Share Structure Reform of 
2005-06 directed at reducing non-tradable state shares and government ownership in Chinese 
PLCs (Jiang, Laurenceson & Tang, 2008; Tseng, 2012). Prior to the reform only about one-
third of the shares in listed companies were legally tradable in markets.  
 
Overall the institutional framework and ownership structure of Chinese firms is distinct from 
many western nations and particularly North America. The high levels of ownership 
concentration, reducing yet significant levels of state ownership and substantial legal 
differences, individually or in combination could reduce the efficacy of board members and 
leadership structures. Determining the degree to which this is the case is considered in the 
next section.   
 
2.2   Effects of Board Leadership Structure 
Anxieties as to the operation of CEO duality were initially raised by the UK Cadbury report 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992) following fears that concentrated power on the board is 
corrupting and reduces the effectiveness of board monitoring (Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994; 
Chen, Liu & Li, 2010). This practice of separating the CEO and chairperson positions has 
subsequently been advocated internationally through corporate governance codes in at least 
16 nations including China (Dahya, 2009). The adoption of this practice varies internationally; 
US companies normally have a higher percentage of companies that practice CEO duality 
(Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001), a lower percentage of companies in the UK, Japan, Italy 
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and Belgium combine the two positions of CEO and chairperson (Boyd, Howard & Carroll, 
1997).  
 
Advantages of CEO duality are believed to include unity of command, clear cut leadership 
(Anderson & Anthony, 1986; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Boyd, 1995) and lower 
information costs (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997). It is further proposed the costs of 
monitoring and transferring information to a single person should be lower than to two 
persons (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997). Stewardship theorists 
also advocate a single person undertaking both roles benefits the firm by removing internal 
and external ambiguity regarding responsibility for a firm’s processes and outcomes 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Peng, Zhang & Li, 2007). A 
separate board leadership structure could therefore engender conflict between management 
and board, create confusion and curtail innovation (Baliga, Moyer & Rao, 1996). 
 
CEO duality may also impose costs on firms; this practice could reduce the effectiveness of 
board monitoring and weaken board control (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Boyd, 1995) 
ultimately reducing firm performance (Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Worrell, Nemec & 
Davidson, 1997; Bai, Liu, Lu, Song & Zhang, 2004; He, 2008). Entrenched managers, 
through their high ownership may also reduce the monitoring role of the board by combining 
the positions of chairperson and CEO (Lasfer, 2006). Further the presence of an independent 
chairperson can provide balance to the board, afford a valuable ‘outside’ perspective and kerb 
the power of the CEO (Stile & Taylor, 2001).  
 
Echoing these theoretical differences, the extensive empirical literature examining the 
influence of CEO duality over firm performance has provided mixed results (see Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Finegold, Benson & Hecht, 2007; Rhoades, Rechner & 
Sundaramurthy, 2001). Some empirical work has supported the arrangement of separating 
CEO and chairperson positions (e.g. Worrell, Nemec & Davidson, 1997; He, 2008) with 
other empirical work in disagreement (e.g. Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Further evidence has 
indicated this corporate governance arrangement has no influence on firm performance at all 
(e.g. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Rechner & Dalton, 
1989; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). This multiplicity of findings is also observed in Chinese 
context. CEO duality is negatively (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song & Zhang, 2004) and positively (Peng, 
Zhang & Li, 2007; Tian & Lau 2001) related to firm performance albeit for distinct samples, 
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metrics of performance and time periods. Other studies (Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom & Lu, 
2008; You & Du 2012; Chen, Ezzamel & Cai, 2011) reported CEO duality is not related to 
firm performance.  
 
This lack of clarity and subsequent decline in empirical research of CEO duality has both 
methodological and conceptual roots. It became apparent CEO duality is a non-random, 
organizational practice only adopted under certain conditions. Whether board leadership 
structure enhances or lowers performance depends on its fit with a firm’s internal and 
external conditions (Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). Subsequently researchers began to adopt a 
contingency (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Boyd, 1995) and integrative approaches (Kwok, 
1998) to examine these relationships. The contingency approach assumes CEO duality could 
enhance firm performance in certain contexts, such as low CEO informal power or low firm 
performance (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994) and in environments with resource scarcity or 
high complexity (Boyd, 1995). An integrative approach (Kwok, 1998) considered the impact 
of agency problems and agency control mechanisms on firms’ performance.  
 
Drawing on these insights CEO duality is currently regarded to be an organisational practice 
adopted under appropriate or inappropriate conditions rather than a random phenomenon 
(Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). Antecedents of CEO duality would include “(1) duality as a 
reward for a CEO’s good performance, (2) duality as a solution to environmental resource-
scarcity, complexity and dynamism, (3) duality as conforming to institutional pressures, (4) 
duality as a result of social exchange reciprocity and (5) duality as imposed by a powerful 
CEO” (Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). 
 
Evidence of these antecedents is mixed. The reward explanation of duality is based on 
Vancil’s (1987) succession framework and Brickley, Coles & Jarrell (1997) succession 
planning theory. If the new CEO performs well, then he/she is rewarded with the chairperson 
title (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997). CEO duality may also arise as a solution to 
environmental resource-scarcity, complexity and dynamism such as ‘scope of operations’, 
nature, diversity and complexity of the business production process (Boone, Field, Karpoff, 
& Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008). As information requirements of larger and 
more complex firms are higher, the information transfer costs of boards with a separate board 
leadership structure may become excessive. This is particularly the case when a CEO 
possesses firm-specific knowledge.  
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CEO duality might also result from institutional social exchange reciprocity and power 
explanations. Linck, Netter & Yang (2008) and Pathan and Skully (2010) both report the 
probability of CEO duality increases with CEO power measured by the shareholding 
percentage of directors and executives and closeness of CEOs to retirement. CEO duality also 
declines with increased constraints on CEO power. For example, high levels of shareholding 
by non-affiliated persons/institutions could restrain CEO power (Pathan & Skully, 2010). 
Similarly CEO duality may arise from institutional pressures, where the ownership structure 
(Bekiris, 2013) and specifically block holders influence firms to separate CEO and 
chairperson roles to enhance board independence (Mak & Li, 2001). As the largest 
shareholder and block shareholders have the resources and incentives to supervise the work 
of management, concentrated and block ownership may be an influential mechanism to 
mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Claessens & Djankov, 1999) and the composition of the board (Essen, Oosterhout & Carney, 
2012).   
 
Results from the international empirical literature also exhibit these multiple themes. CEO 
duality has been reported as positively associated with firm size, CEO age and board size for 
US firms (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008), with firm size, CEO ownership and CEO tenure for 
US banks (Pathan & Skully, 2010), with firm size and performance for Australian firms 
(Monem, 2013) and CEO age and tenure for UK firms (Dedman, 2000). CEO duality also 
appears to be negatively related with regulatory intensions in the US and UK (Pathan & 
Skully, 2010; Dedman, 2000) and non-affiliated block shareholding in Greece. Within China 
investigations of board size, composition, independence and compensation report firm 
complexity (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2011) and ownership concentration (Su, Xu & Phan, 2008) 
are significant influences. 
 
3.  Methodology 
In this section we outline how the research questions are addressed. Question a) is tested 
using logit regression analysis and propensity-score matching methods are used to examine 
questions b) and c). Firm performance is examined using firms’ profitability ratios (ROA and 
ROE) and agency costs are examined using the expense ratio. The data, the model employed 
and the definition of the variables are considered sequentially.  
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3.1  Data Employed  
The data set is from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database 
and covers all Chinese public listed companies from 2003 to 2010, excluding financial sector 
companies. The CSMAR database is designed by the China Accounting and Finance 
Research Centre of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and developed by Shenzhen GTA 
Information Technology Corporation Limited. Chinese companies may issue three types of 
tradable shares. Tradable ‘A’ shares are listed on the two domestic stock exchanges 
(Shanghai and Shenzhen) to domestic investors and denominated in Chinese currency 
Renminbi (RMB). ‘B’ shares are issued to foreign investors traded in either US or Hong 
Kong dollars. A Chinese company may also trade on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 
issue ‘H’ shares (Conyon & He, 2011). This study deals with Chinese PLCs that only issue 
‘A’ shares in domestic stock exchanges; firms which issue B shares are not considered. The 
data of those companies with special treatment and incomplete data were deleted leaving a 
final sample size of 9,371 firms.  
 
The data considers the accounting performance of Chinese firms. Accounting-based measures 
are chosen for the following reasons. As capital markets in China are not well developed, 
volatile, market-based measures may not reflect firms’ true performance. The turnover ratios 
of the Chinese stock exchanges are approximately 700-1000 per cent, versus 67 per cent in 
the United States (Xu & Wang, 1999: 85). The average holding period lasts about 1-2 months 
in China versus 18 months in the United States. As a result, market-based measures in China 
tend to be less informationally efficient (Tenev & Zhang, 2002).  
 
Notwithstanding the benefits of accounting data, the ability to manipulate accounting data has 
evolved with the autonomy enjoyed by management of Chinese SOEs. To overcome these 
concerns accounting and reporting of the publicly listed companies in China has undergone a 
process of standardization in recent years. The Chinese government has made substantial 
efforts to improve the statutory requirements for the disclosures of listed companies with 
Chinese PLCs required to disclose annual reports publicly.  
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the main security (finance) 
regulator which supervises the listing and trading of Chinese listed companies. The two stock 
exchanges operating in Shanghai and Shenzhen have also formulated certain detailed rules on 
information disclosures of listed companies. In addition, the governmental authority 
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responsible for accounting and finance (The Ministry of Finance) has formulated and 
enforced specific accounting regulations or standards particularly applicable to listed 
companies. Overall it is expected that the quality of financial account information of public 
listed companies is generally better compared to non-listed companies. Despite these 
improvements to accounting practice, it is acknowledged that outliers could exist within this 
data. Therefore firm performance and the expense ratio
1
 are winsorized; a commonly used 
technique in corporate governance literature (e.g. Bebchuk, Cremers & Peyer, 2011; Erkens, 
Hung & Matos, 2012; Liu, Bredin, Wang & Yi, 2011). Winsorizing or winsorization is the 
transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the 
effect of possibly spurious outliers.  To winsorize the data, tail values are set equal to some 
specified percentile of the data. Winsorizing is different than simply excluding data, called 
trimming. Through trimming, the extreme values are discarded. Winsorized estimators are 
usually more robust to outliers than their unwinsorized counterparts (Yang, Xie & Goh, 
2011). Descriptive statistics of the data set are presented in Table 1 and are discussed in the 
analysis section.  
 
3.2  Variable Definition 
Financial performance is defined as the company's ability to generate new resources from 
day-to-day operations over a given period of time and performance is gauged by net income 
and cash from operations. This study uses financial performance indicators ROA (return on 
assets) and ROE (return on equity) to measure profitability and the expense ratio to measure 
agency costs. There are theoretical reasons for examining profitability measures of 
performance. Agency theory predicts that managers will squander profits on excessive 
salaries and managerial perquisites, so leaving less available to shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980). Chinese scholars, practitioners and officials 
also attach great importance to ROE. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
the Chinese equivalent of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has required 
that for a listed firm, its ROE has to be positive in one of every three consecutive years; 
otherwise, it will be delisted (Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007). ROE is obtained by dividing net 
profits with average shareholders’ equity. ROA is used because it is directly related to 
management’s ability to efficiently utilise corporate assets, which are ultimately the property 
                                                 
1
 We winsorize ROA and ROE at 2.5% level and expenses ratio at 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
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of shareholders. ROA is defined as earnings before interest and tax divided by average total 
assets. 
 
The expense ratio is measured as the sum total of selling and management expenses divided 
by operating revenue. Expenses include travel expenses for executives, advertising and 
marketing costs, rent, luxury automobiles and other utilities. The ratio reflects the managerial 
discretion in spending company resources measuring how effectively the management of the 
company controls operating costs and other direct agency costs. This definition is similar to 
that used in other studies: be this operating expenses divided by annual sales (see Ang, Cole 
& Lin, 2000; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011) or the ratio of selling, general and administrative 
expenses to sales (Florackis, 2008; Singh & Davidson, 2003).  
 
Although accounting ratios offer a quick and useful method of analysing the performance of a 
business, they inherit the limitations of the financial statements on which they are based. 
Furthermore, differences in accounting policies and financial year-ends contribute to 
problems of evaluation (Atrill & Mclaney, 2001). Multiple performance measures are 
therefore used to ameliorate the limitations of any single financial measurement (Muth & 
Donaldson 1998), to capture the distinct aspects of firm performance encompassed in 
different metrics and engender a more precise description of performance (Rechner & Dalton, 
1991; Dalton & Kesner, 1985: 752).  
 
Corporate governance variables include a CEO duality dummy, board size, the executive’s 
shareholding percentage, largest shareholding percentage and state ownership. CEO duality 
occurs when the CEO also holds a chairperson role and the CEO duality dummy equals to 
one when the two positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board size is the number of 
board directors. CEO ownership is measured by the CEO’s shareholding percentage. Largest 
shareholding is measured by the principal shareholding percentage. State ownership is the 
percentage of the firm owned by the Chinese state. The variables for firm characteristics are 
firm age and size. Firm size is considered as monitoring and agency costs are higher in large 
firms (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). Following Gilson (1997) the natural log of 
total assets is used as a proxy of firm size. Exogenous effects are accommodated by 
controlling for industry and market specific factors using the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) industry classification (see Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008). The financial 
industry is excluded from the analysis and industry dummies are included to adjust for 
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industry effects. Year dummies are used to control for year effects. These variable definitions 
are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Variable Definitions 
Variable name Description 
ROA 
Return on assets 
Earnings before interest and tax / average total assets.  
Average total assets: (Beginning total assets + ending total assets)/2 
ROE 
Return on equity 
Net profits/ average shareholders’ equity 
Expenr 
Expense ratio  
(Selling expense+ management expense) / operating revenue 
The sum total of selling and management expenses divided by operating revenue 
Ceodua 
CEO duality 
CEO also holds a chairperson position. The CEO duality dummy equals to one when the 
two positions are combined and zero otherwise.  
Bsize 
Board Size 
Number of board of directors 
Ceoop 
CEO’s shareholding ownership  
The proportion of shares held by the CEO 
Bigop 
Largest shareholding  
The proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder 
Stateop 
State ownership  
The proportion of the shares held by the Chinese state 
Lnasset 
Firm size  
The natural log of total assets 
Listage 
Listing Age 
Firm’s age since listing 
Industry dummies 
Industry  
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry classification 
Year dummies Year dummies 
 
Note: The data is from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
 
3.3  Model Design  
To address the first research question an approach similar to that adopted by Linck, Netter & 
Yang (2008) using a logit model is adopted. This model is written as:  
 
                      Ceodua= a+ β X+ Industry Dummies+ Year Dummies + ɛ       (1) 
 
where Ceodua represents the board leadership structure as the dependent variable which takes 
the value of one when the positions of Chairperson and CEO is combined and zero otherwise. 
X
 
is a vector of variables including board and firm characteristics. Board and CEO 
characteristics include board size, CEO ownership, CEO age and CEO tenure. The variables 
for firm characteristics are the largest shareholding percentage, state ownership, firm 
performance, firms’ listing age and firm size. β represents the coefficients to be estimated and 
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ɛ
 
is the error term. Industry and year dummies are used to control for industry and year 
effects. 
    
The estimation of this model is complicated by econometric challenges. The  hypothesises 
considered can all display endogeneity where firm performance might influence board 
leadership structure or alternatively, board leadership structure could influence firm 
performance. To address this problem an array of measures are adopted. Initially, all the 
independent variables are lagged by one year. Secondly, robust regressions with standard 
errors clustered by the firm are used to control for firm effects. 
 
When examining research questions b) and c), propensity score matching (hereafter PSM) 
methods are used to accommodate potential endogeneity (see Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; 
Heckman, Ichimura & Todd, 1997, 1998; Yang & Mallick, 2010; Mallick & Yang, 2011, 
2013). PSM techniques enables ‘like-for-like’ comparison and is an appropriate method to 
examine the relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance through 
estimating how distinct groups adopting and not adopting corporate governance 
developments differ.  
 
To apply the PSM technique, a logit model where the dependent variable is a CEO duality 
dummy and the regressors are the firm characteristics and industry dummies is estimated. The 
probability (propensity score) that each company uses CEO duality is derived and used to 
determine the matched treated (CEO duality) and untreated (separate board leadership 
structure) samples. Rather than regressing performance on board leadership structure in the 
whole sample of observations, the average effect of CEO duality on firm performance in the 
matched samples (also known as the average treatment on treated effect; hereafter ATT) is 
estimated. The magnitude of difference in firm performance between the treatment group 
(companies using CEO duality) and control groups (companies with a separate leadership 
structure) are then derived by estimating the following equation:  
 
                                                                 (2) 
 
where      is the average performance difference between matched treatment and control 
companies,     represents the performance of company i in year t and D is a dummy variable 
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equal to one if the board leadership structure is combined and zero otherwise. The propensity 
score   is equal to Pr[D=1|X] representing the probability of processing CEO duality 
leadership structure based on the given company characteristics X. The given company 
characteristics include assets, listing age, largest shareholding percentage, state ownership, 
CEO’s share ownership, CEO age, CEO tenure and industry sector. As non-matched samples 
are more diverse and less comparable than matched samples, the measured effect of board 
leadership structure on firm performance might be higher than when a matched sample is 
used and hence it is important to make firms as comparable as possible during the matching 
process.  
 
The PSM approach is used to adjust for pre-treatment observable differences between treated 
and untreated companies using three different matching methods: nearest neighbour matching, 
radius caliper matching and kernel matching. The benchmark results are based on kernel 
matching. The nearest neighbour matching procedure chooses matching partners for a treated 
company from the control group in terms of proximity to the propensity score. This is called 
‘one to one’ nearest neighbour matching which is often considered as an initial step in the 
PSM method. The k nearest neighbour matching allows the usage of k units in control group 
as matching partners for a treated company (Mallick & Yang, 2011); this study uses the 
nearest neighbour and three nearest neighbours marching method. 
 
Radius calliper matching imposes a propensity score distance requirement, namely, the 
caliper. The caliper value draws a maximum distance of matched companies in the treated 
and control groups that is closest in terms of the propensity score. Radius matching uses all of 
the comparison members within the caliper and allows the usage of extra (fewer) units when 
good matches are not available (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Lastly, kernel matching 
methods employ a kernel weighted average of the propensity score to obtain balanced 
matched firms. By using this method, the control (untreated) observations will be assigned 
more weights if they are closer in terms of propensity score to a treated firm and lower 
weights placed on more distant observations (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The analysis is 
conducted on 1,379 treatment companies and matched companies are chosen from the 7,597 
companies with a separate board leadership structure. 
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4.  Data Analysis  
The data analysis includes the descriptive statistics of the data set and the outcome of the 
regression model (1) and equation (2) respectively. In Table 2 we outline descriptive statistics 
and in Table 3 correlations between model variables are forwarded. The regression model 
results are reported in Table 4 and PSM results are presented in Table 5.   
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Within Table 2 four panels are presented including average values in Panel A, dispersion of 
values in Panel B, comparative data in Panel C and the percentage of observations in different 
industries in Panel D. In Table 2 Panel A, the percentage of Chinese PLCs practising CEO 
duality has increased since 2005 with 22.5% of companies having CEO duality in 2010. The 
number of board directors is 10 in 2003, falling to 9 in 2010. CEO share ownership has 
increased overtime albeit from low levels; the average of CEO ownership was 0.2% in 2003, 
rising to 4.2% in 2010. The average CEO age is between 47 and 48 during 2009 and 2010. 
State ownership has been reduced over time from 37.5% in 2003 to 7.8% in 2010. Many 
Chinese PLCs also have concentrated ownership structure with the average largest 
shareholding percentage above 40% between 2003 and 2005. This level of concentrated 
ownership declines to approximately 36% between 2006 and 2010. The firm performance 
measured by ROA and ROE reveals firm performance also falls in 2008 due to the financial 
crisis, recovering in 2009. The expense ratio is approximately 17% between 2003 and 2005, 
falling to 15% between 2009 and 2010. 
 
Panel B in Table 2 reports on average 15.3% of companies pursue CEO duality, the average 
CEO share ownership is 1.6% and average state ownership is 23.4%. The mean, median and 
maximum of largest shareholding percentage is 0.381, 0.362 and 0.865 respectively. The 75 
percentile value of largest shareholding is 0.503 which means that the largest shareholder 
control more than 50% of ownership in approximately 25% of observations; a high degree of 
ownership concentration. The average of ROA, ROE and expense ratio are 6.5%, 7.8% and 
15.3% respectively. Panel C indicates for companies displaying CEO duality, CEOs hold 
more shares of the firm and are older, state ownership and largest shareholding percentage 
are lower, company size is smaller and the companies’ profitability and expense ratios are 
higher. CEOs which also hold chairperson positions require higher pay to align their interests 
with company objectives.  
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Panel D of Table 2 displays the sample distribution among  industries grouped according to 
the Industry Classification of Listed Companies by CSRC (2001 version). We observe the 
largest concentration of firms is from the manufacturing sector (59.42%). Large differences 
are recorded between industry classifications for example, the information technology sector 
having the highest average percentage of companies that practice CEO duality (23.2%) and 
the lowest in the petrol, gas and mining sector (5.6%).  
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive data according to each year 
Year Ceodua Bsize Ceoop Ceoage Stateop Bigop ROA ROE Expenr Sample size 
2003 0.107 9.95 0.002 45.29 0.375 0.437 0.054 0.056 0.170 845 
2004 0.121 9.71 0.004 45.55 0.356 0.428 0.056 0.061 0.163 1,011 
2005 0.108 9.61 0.003 45.76 0.338 0.409 0.046 0.042 0.169 1,068 
2006 0.118 9.42 0.005 46.05 0.289 0.361 0.060 0.069 0.155 1,115 
2007 0.155 9.30 0.013 46.25 0.247 0.359 0.080 0.104 0.133 1,194 
2008 0.159 9.18 0.017 46.76 0.212 0.364 0.063 0.073 0.143 1,268 
2009 0.175 9.05 0.025 47.20 0.119 0.365 0.071 0.092 0.151 1,197 
2010 0.225 8.97 0.042 47.55 0.078 0.361 0.078 0.101 0.150 1,673 
Panel B: Descriptive data – overall variation 
Mean 0.153 9.35 0.016 46.44 0.234 0.381 0.065 0.078 0.153 
 
Median 0 9 0 46 0.159 0.362 0.060 0.077 0.119 
 
S.D. 0.360 1.95 0.067 6.54 0.248 0.159 0.057 0.106 0.127 
 
Minimum 0 3 0 26 0 0.035 -0.090 -0.296 0.016 
 
Maximum 1 19 0.693 75 0.898 0.865 0.212 0.321 0.773 
 
Panel C: Descriptive data - comparison 
Ceodua Bsize Ceoop Ceoage Stateop Bigop Lnasset ROA Listage ROE Expenr 
0 9.45 0.0058 46.02 0.250 0.385 21.50 0.063 8.82 0.075 0.149 
1 8.78 0.0739 48.74 0.147 0.359 21.14 0.075 6.88 0.089 0.175 
Panel D: Industry Classification 
Industry 
Code 
Industry Type Ceodua Sample Size Per cent 
A Agriculture, forestry, grazing and fishing 0.156 211 2.25 
B Patrol/natural gas/coal mining 0.056 144 1.54 
C Manufacturing 0.166 5,568 59.42 
D Electricity/gas/hot water supply 0.119 352 3.76 
E Civil engineering/Construction 0.060 199 2.12 
F Transportation and warehousing 0.072 349 3.72 
G Information technology 0.232 604 6.45 
H Wholesale and retail 0.117 606 6.47 
J Real estate 0.135 488 5.21 
K Public facilities service 0.117 300 3.20 
L Media and culture 0.133 60 0.64 
M Conglomerates 0.143 490 5.23 
Total 
 
 9,371 100 
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Notes: Ceodua: CEO duality dummy equals to one when the positions of chairperson and CEO are combined 
and zero otherwise. Board size: the number of board directors. Ceoop: the proportion of shares held by the CEO.  
Ceoage; the age of CEO. Stateop: the proportion of shares held by the Chinese State. Bigop: The proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholder. ROA: Earnings before interest and tax/ average total assets. ROE: Net 
profits/ average shareholders’ equity. Expenr: (selling expense+ management expense)/operating revenue. The 
data is from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
 
Table 3 shows a matrix of pairwise variables’ correlations. From Table 3 we observe the 
correlations of pairwise variables are very low, except between ROA and ROE and the 
largest shareholding percentage and state ownership. 
 
Table 3:  Correlation Matrix  
Correlation Matrix  
 
ROA ROE Ceodua Bsize Ceoop Ceoage 
 
Ceotenure 
 
Stateop 
 
Bigop 
 
Lnasset 
 
Listage 
ROA 1 
     
     
ROE 0.886 1 
    
     
Ceodua 0.078 0.051 1 
   
     
Bsize -0.0007 0.018 -0.127 1 
  
     
Ceoop 0.170 0.107 0.369 -0.105 1 
 
     
Ceoage 0.029 0.029 0.152 0.047 -0.0005 1 
     
Ceotenure 0.048 0.031 0.023 0.027 0.02 0.078 
 
1 
    
Stateop -0.079 -0.069 -0.152 0.179 -0.210 0.042 
 
-0.017 
 
1 
   
Bigop 0.092 0.095 -0.057 0.006 -0.055 0.013 
 
-0.018 
 
0.482 
 
1 
  
Lnasset 0.098 0.191 -0.127 0.213 -0.163 0.127 
 
0.02 
 
0.124 
 
0.184 
 
1 
 
Listage -0.194 -0.108 -0.160 -0.030 -0.337 0.086 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.150 
 
0.289 
 
1 
 
Notes: ROA: Earnings before interest and tax/ average total assets. ROE: Net profits/ average shareholders’ 
equity. Ceodua: CEO duality dummy equals to one when the positions of chairperson and CEO are combined 
and zero otherwise. Board size: number of board directors. Ceoop: the proportion of shares held by the CEO. 
CEO age: the age of CEO. Ceotenure: the tenure of CEO. Bigop: the proportion of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. Stateop: the proportion of shares held by the Chinese State. Lnasset: log of the firm’s assets.  
Listage: firm’s age since listing. The data is from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. 
 
4.2   Logit Regression Analysis  
Table 4 presents the results of the logit regression model. The dependent variable is CEO 
duality and independent variables are board size, CEO’s share ownership, CEO age, CEO 
tenure, the largest shareholding percentage, state ownership, firm performance, firms’ listing 
age and firm size. Industry and year dummies are controlled in the model and firm 
performance is measured by ROA and ROE respectively. As state ownership and the largest 
shareholding percentage are related (the correlation is 0.48) these two variables are estimated 
in separate models. Models 1 and 2 presents the results with largest shareholding percentage 
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as the main ownership variable for ROA and ROE and models 3 and 4 presents the results 
with state ownership as the ownership variable for ROA and ROE, respectively.  
 
Table 4:  Determinants of Board Leadership Structure 2003-2010 
 
Table 4: Determinants of board leadership structure for Chinese PLCs 2003-2010 
  Dependent variable: Ceodua    
Independent 
variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4     
ROA 
0.599 
(1.028) 
 
0.265 
(1.039) 
 
ROE 
 
0.269 
(0.517) 
 
0.089 
(0.521) 
Bigop 
-0.931* 
(0.438) 
-0.929* 
(0.438) 
  
State ownership 
  
-1.18*** 
(0.282) 
-1.18*** 
(0.282) 
Board size 
  -0.149** 
(0.039) 
-0.149** 
(0.039) 
-0.133** 
(0.037) 
-0.133** 
(0.037) 
CEO ownership 
   6.37*** 
(0.939) 
  6.39*** 
(0.936) 
        6.1*** 
       (0.963)  
6.11*** 
(0.96) 
CEO age 
     0.062*** 
(0.01) 
     0.062*** 
(0.01) 
0.064*** 
   (0.01) 
  0.064*** 
(0.01) 
CEO tenure 
0.028 
(0.039) 
          0.028 
         (0.039)  
        0.030 
       (0.039) 
      0.031 
     (0.039) 
Lnasset 
-0.213* 
(0.078) 
-0.214* 
(0.079) 
       -0.208* 
       (0.076) 
     -0.208* 
     (0.077) 
Listage 
 -0.048** 
(0.017) 
-0.049** 
(0.017) 
       -0.042* 
       (0.017) 
     -0.043* 
     (0.017) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 
1.621 
(1.621) 
1.66 
(1.633) 
1.26 
(1.61) 
1.26 
(1.625) 
N 7,242 7,242 7,242 7,242 
Model P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.105 0.105 0.111 0.111 
 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
Notes: Ceodua: CEO duality dummy equals to one when the roles of chairperson and CEO are combined and 
zero otherwise. ROA: Earnings before interest and tax/ average total assets. ROE: Net profits/average 
shareholders’ equity. Bigop: the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. State ownership: the 
proportion of shares held by the Chinese State. Board size: the number of board directors. CEO ownership: the 
proportion of shares held by the CEO. CEO age: the age of CEO. CEO tenure: the tenure of CEO. Lnasset: log 
of the firm’s assets.  Listage: firm’s age since listing. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. The data is 
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
 
Both models 1 and 2 show that firm performance is not related to CEO duality, indicating 
rewards do not appear to be an antecedent of CEO duality for Chinese PLCs. The largest 
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shareholding percentage, board size, firm’s listing age and log of firm’s assets are negatively 
related to CEO duality. CEO ownership is positively related to CEO duality and CEO tenure 
is not related to CEO duality. In model 3 and 4 state ownership variable is added to replace 
the largest shareholding percentage variable. State ownership is negatively related to CEO 
duality. The results of other independent variables remain unchanged. The results show that 
companies with a high largest shareholding percentage or a high state ownership are less 
likely to adopt a CEO duality board leadership structure.  
 
The corporate governance literature has identified block ownership as an influential 
mechanism that mitigates the agency problem between managers and shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Essen et al. (2012) did a meta-analysis of 
86 studies and conclude that board structure and composition preference are influenced by 
the identity of the concentrated owners. The results show that the largest shareholder plays a 
positive role in establishing a separate board leadership structure and mitigating the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders for Chinese PLCs. The Basic Norms issued in 
2000 stipulates that in principle the chairperson of the board of directors and the general 
manager (CEO) could not be the same person. As a result, the percentage of public listed 
companies practising CEO duality has decreased. Chinese listed companies normally have 
high state ownership and many of the listed firms’ CEOs were appointed by the government 
(Su, Xu & Phan, 2008). In companies with a high state ownership structure, there is a 
political legitimacy to conform to the Basic Norms by separating the roles of Chairman and 
CEO. Within Table 4 we can consistently observe the relative importance of ownership 
structures in influencing board leadership structure for Chinese PLCs. 
 
Chinese companies with a larger board and larger or older companies are less likely to 
employ CEO duality, probably due to legitimacy reasons. As firms grow, they become more 
complex in their operations and organizational structures and there is a higher need to 
separate the chairperson and CEO positions. CEO ownership is positively related to CEO 
duality, indicating that Chinese firms with a high CEO ownership are more likely to choose a 
board that is difficult to monitor. The finding is consistent with Lasfer (2006) and Dey et al. 
(2011). CEO ownership is one of the proxies for CEO power in Pathan and Skully (2010). 
Lasfer (2006) argue that entrenched managers, through their high ownership, reduce the 
monitoring role of the board by combining the positions of chairman and CEO. The finding 
from this study also questions the effectiveness of board leadership structure when CEO 
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ownership is very high. This next section examines the relationship between board leadership 
structure and firm performance. To address the issue of endogeneity the results are presented  
using propensity score matching (PSM) methods. 
 
4.3  Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Methods 
Table 5 presents average performance differences between companies using CEO duality and 
firms with a separate leadership structure. The first column reports the matching method used, 
the second column presents the average performance differences between unmatched 
companies while the third column conveys the results among matched companies. When the 
performance is measured by ROA, the unmatched result shows that for companies using CEO 
duality, the average ROA is 1.2% higher than for companies with a separate leadership 
structure; a statistically significant difference. Using the nearest neighbour matching method, 
the average performance difference in ROA between companies with different board 
leadership structures is 0.3%, a non-significant value. The analysis is conducted on 1,379 
treatment companies and matched companies are chosen among 7,597 companies with a 
separate board leadership structure. The three nearest neighbour matching method also shows 
that there is no significant performance difference in ROA between companies with different 
board leadership structures. 
 
To avoid the matching bias and improve matching quality some treatment observations 
whose propensity scores are higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum of the 
propensity score of untreated group are dropped. When the outcome variable is ROA using 
radius calliper matching, some treatment companies were dropped and only 903 observations 
are included in the treatment group. Kernel matching again shows consistently there is no 
difference for average performance in terms of ROA between companies with different board 
leadership structures. When the outcome variable is ROE, all methods report that after 
matching there is no difference for average performance between companies with different 
board leadership structures. These findings are consistent with Chen, Ezzamel & Cai (2011); 
Lam, McGuinners & Vieito (2013) and You & Du (2012). You and Du (2012) and Chen et al. 
(2011) document that CEO duality is not related to firm performance for Chinese PLCs 
during 2005-2008 and 1999-2009 respectively.  
 
When the outcome variable is the expense ratio, the unmatched result indicates companies 
using CEO duality have an average expense ratio 2.8% higher than companies with a separate 
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board leadership structure; a statistically significant differences. For nearest neighbour 
matching, the mean difference of the expense ratio is reduced to 1.7%. All the other three 
matching methods show that for matched companies, there is a statistically significant 
difference for the average expense ratio among companies with different leadership structures. 
This indicates there is a higher agency cost for companies using CEO duality.  
 
Table 5:  Propensity Score Matching Methods: Kernel Matching, Radius and  
Caliper Matching, and Nearest Neighbor Matching 
 
Matching method Unmatched Mean 
difference (T ratios) 
Matched mean difference 
(T ratios of ATT) 
Treated  
N 
Control 
N 
 ROA    
Nearest neighbor 0.012 (7.21) 0.003   (0.68) 1,379 7,597 
Three nearest neighbors  0.001   (0.29) 1,379 7,579 
Radius caliper  0.002   (0.87) 903 7,597 
Kernel  0.002   (0.71) 1,379 7,597 
 ROE    
Nearest neighbor 0.015 (4.79) 0.009   (1.31) 1,379 7,597 
Three nearest neighbors  0.004   (0.81) 1,379 7,579 
Radius caliper  0.005   (1.09) 903 7,597 
Kernel  0.006   (1.17) 1,379 7,597 
 Expense ratio    
Nearest neighbor 0.028 (7.49) 0.017   (1.89) 1,369 7,476 
Three nearest neighbors  0.020   (2.97) 1,369 7,476 
Radius caliper  0.016   (2.74) 909 7,476 
Kernel  0.022   (3.80) 1,369 7,476 
 
Notes: Three different matching methods are used, including nearest neighbor matching, radius caliper matching 
and kernel matching. . ‘ATT’ refers to the average treatment effect for the treated in terms of outcome variables, 
including ROA, ROE and Expense ratio. ‘t-ratio (ATT)’ is the t-ratios of the average treatment effect. ‘Treated’ 
and ‘Control’ are the number of firms in the treated group and untreated group, respectively (the companies that 
have a CEO duality leadership structure are in the treatment group; companies that have a separate board 
leadership are in the untreated group). ROA: Earnings before interest and tax/ average total assets. ROE: Net 
profits/ average shareholders’ equity. Expense ratio: (selling expense+ management expense)/operating revenue. 
The data is from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
 
These results could be biased if the quality of matching is poor, therefore determining the 
quality of matching is an important robustness procedure. Further tests (see Yang & Mallick 
2010) are therefore undertaken to determine the equality of the given firm characteristics 
after matching between treated and untreated groups. T-tests are conducted to check whether  
differences between the two groups remain large after conditioning of the propensity score. 
Appropriate matching is evidenced by the equality of the given firm characteristics not being 
different at a significant level, denoting matched treated and untreated groups have similar 
firm characteristics (Yang & Mallick, 2010). As reported in Appendix 1, when the outcome 
variable is the expense ratio, most covariates between treated and control (untreated) groups 
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after kernel matching are similar as the p-values are insignificant. The balancing propensities 
of matched companies after the nearest neighbor matching show similar results. For radius 
calliper matching, all covariates between treated and control groups are similar. The results 
indicate that each matching technique generates a control group which is similar enough to 
the treatment group for the ATT estimation and indicates good matching quality. 
 
In conclusion CEO duality is not related to companies’ financial ratios for Chinese PLCs. 
Companies using CEO duality have higher expense ratio compared to matched companies 
with a separate leadership structure. This indicates that a separate board leadership structure 
is an effective corporate governance arrangement to reduce agency costs for Chinese PLCs. It 
is recommended that the positions of chairperson and CEO should be separated for Chinese 
PLCs.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
This study examines the determinants and effects of board leadership structure for Chinese 
PLCs from 2003–2010. The results show that the largest shareholding percentage, state 
ownership, board size, firm’s listing age, and firm size are negatively related to CEO duality. 
CEO ownership and CEO age are positively related to CEO duality. These results indicate 
that ownership structure is an important determinant of board leadership structure for Chinese 
PLCs. This study also examines the relationship between board leadership structure and firm 
performance. Using PSM methods to address endogeneity and robust to different matching 
estimators, it is reported that CEO duality is not related to companies’ profitability ratios, 
while companies adopting a CEO duality board leadership structure have a higher expense 
ratio compared to matched companies with a separate board leadership structure. This 
indicates a separate board leadership structure is an effective corporate governance 
arrangement to reduce agency costs for Chinese PLCs.  
 
China has been transformed through the rapid economic growth since its Open Door Reforms 
of the 1980s; however great challenges lie ahead. During the economic reforms, corporate 
governance rules have been developed and revised to establish stable and strong institutional 
foundations. This study examines the efficacy of one of these corporate governance reforms; 
whether a separate board leadership structure is an effective corporate governance 
arrangement to reduce agency costs for Chinese PLCs. This question has important 
implications for Chinese PLCs and investors in China’s stock markets. Chinese investors 
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need to be more cautious if they want to invest in companies employing CEO duality as on 
average there are greater agency costs in companies combining CEO and chairperson 
positions relative to firms operating a separate board leadership structure.  
 
The findings also indicate Chinese PLCs are more likely to combine the CEO and 
chairperson positions when the CEO has greater power and constraints on such privilege are 
restricted. The largest shareholder and state shareholding have a positive influence through 
enhancing the independence of board leadership structure and companies with a diverse 
shareholding structure suffer more from ‘insider control’ problems and greater agency costs. 
We suppose as China’s legal institutions are quite weak and the largest shareholders have the 
resources to supervise the work of management, large shareholders play a positive role in 
mitigating the agency problems. Of course, while Chinese PLCs also suffer from these 
‘principal-principal’ conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, this study shows 
that the largest shareholder plays a positive role in influencing the board leadership structure, 
not minority shareholders.  
 
To conclude, it is important to develop legal frameworks and corporate governance rules to 
assist Chinese PLCs building effective corporate governance systems, to engender the healthy 
development of Chinese stock markets and attract investors. After 35 years of economic 
reforms, progress has been made in terms of economic development, however, substantial 
efforts are still required to address on-going corporate governance challenges. It is advocated 
determining the efficacy of corporate governance arrangements in the Chinese context 
remains a policy priority.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Balancing propensities of matched companies for Chinese PLCs 2003-2010 with the expense 
ratio as the outcome variable: Kernel matching method 
 
    Mean   t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control t p>t 
State ownership Matched 0.142 0.146 -0.53 0.599 
Board size Matched 8.7663 8.683 1.25 0.211 
CEO ownership Matched 0.075 0.064 2.11 0.035 
CEO age Matched 48.738 48.935 -0.73 0.465 
CEO tenure Matched 1.523 1.603 -1.94 0.052 
Lnasset Matched 21.141 21.108 0.94 0.347 
Listage Matched 6.806 6.800 0.03 0.977 
Year=2003 Matched 0.061 0.066 -0.46 0.645 
Year=2004 Matched 0.084 0.089 -0.47 0.637 
Year=2005 Matched 0.077 0.080 -0.2 0.839 
Year=2006 Matched 0.089 0.089 0.05 0.962 
Year=2007 Matched 0.130 0.124 0.44 0.657 
Year=2008 Matched 0.140 0.153 -0.96 0.34 
Year=2009 Matched 0.143 0.144 -0.05 0.963 
Year=2010 Matched 0.275 0.256 1.12 0.265 
Industry sector A Matched 0.024 0.018 1.07 0.284 
Industry sector B Matched 0.006 0.006 -0.21 0.831 
Industry sector C Matched 0.656 0.648 0.46 0.644 
Industry sector D Matched 0.028 0.028 0.11 0.909 
Industry sector E Matched 0.007 0.008 -0.27 0.789 
Industry sector F Matched 0.013 0.020 -1.45 0.147 
Industry sector G Matched 0.096 0.102 -0.46 0.646 
Industry sector H Matched 0.048 0.049 -0.1 0.92 
Industry sector J Matched 0.045 0.045 -0.01 0.989 
Industry sector K Matched 0.024 0.022 0.31 0.755 
Industry sector L Matched 0.006 0.006 -0.21 0.83 
Industry sector M Matched  0.046 0.047 -0.17 0.867 
 
Notes: This table shows balancing propensities of matched companies from Kernel matching 
method for Chinese PLCs during 2003-2010. Lnasset: log of the firm’s assets. Listage: firm’s 
age since listing. ‘Treated’ and ‘Control’ are the treatment group and untreated group, 
respectively (companies with a CEO duality board leadership structure are in the treatment 
group; and companies with a separate board leadership structure are in the control group). ‘t-
test’ is the t-test to the equality of given firm characteristics between treated and control 
groups. 
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